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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4288
___________
DANIEL L. SPUCK,
Appellant
v.
AMMERMAN J. FREDRIC,
in his official and individual capacity
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00155)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 17, 2011
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 1, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Daniel L. Spuck appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing his
complaint. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment but remand for administrative
purposes.

Spuck, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) in the District Court along with a proposed complaint. The complaint
names as the defendant the judge presiding over Spuck’s proceeding under
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (the “PCRA”). According to Spuck, the
PCRA court dismissed his PCRA petition, but the Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded
to allow Spuck to amend it. Spuck alleges that the PCRA court entered a notice of intent
to dismiss the petition again the day after the Superior Court’s remand, which he claims
was “too soon” because jurisdiction had not yet been transferred back to the PCRA court.
He does not allege that the PCRA court in fact has dismissed his petition or that he
otherwise has suffered any injury, but he seeks $7.2 million in damages and an order
directing the PCRA court to “re-issue” the notice after it acquires jurisdiction. A
Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on the ground that Spuck’s claim is
barred by judicial immunity. The District Court did so by order entered October 22,
2010, and Spuck appeals.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Having conducted that review, we agree
that Spuck’s complaint is barred by judicial immunity for the reasons adequately
explained by the Magistrate Judge. We also note that Spuck has alleged no conceivably
actionable injury, and we are satisfied that any attempt to amend his complaint would be
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futile. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir.
LAR 27.4 (2010).
One administrative matter, however, requires remand. When a complaint is
submitted along with an IFP application, the complaint is not deemed filed unless and
until IFP status is granted. See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 429 n.1 (3d Cir.
1990). In that situation, the District Court must first rule on the IFP application and, only
if it grants the application, proceed to determine whether the complaint should be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,
1085 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). In this
case, the District Court did not expressly rule on Spuck’s IFP application. We will
construe its order as having granted that application because the order dismissed the
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which pertains solely to IFP proceedings.
Because Spuck is a prisoner, however, he is required under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act to pay the full District Court filing fee in installments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Accordingly, we will remand for the District Court to enter an order expressly granting
Spuck’s IFP application and directing the assessment and payment of funds pursuant to
the statute.
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